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Abstract:	  The	   last	  50	  years	  has	  seen	  moves	   towards	  establishing	  a	  sound	  epistemic	  
basis	   for	  design	  as	  a	  knowledge	  discipline.	  Despite	  this,	  there	   is	  still	  a	   lack	  of	  clarity	  
and	  penetration	  of	  such	  epistemic	  studies	  into	  pedagogy	  and	  practice,	  as	  well	  as	  little	  
consensus	  of	  a	   foundational	  structure	  to	  the	  territory	  of	  specialized	  knowledge	  and	  
knowledge	   acquisition.	   This	   raises	   the	   issue	   that	   there	   remains	   several	  
epistemological	  ‘big	  challenges’	  across	  the	  entire	  spectrum	  of	  design	  disciplines	  –	  or	  
as	  a	  generalized	  design	  knowledge	  (Cross,	  2013).	  This	  theme	  will	  explore	  the	  current	  
state	   of	   design	   epistemology	   and	   pose	   a	   range	   of	   questions	   that	   remain	   generally	  
unanswered,	   or	   incompletely	   answered.	   Such	   questions	   have	   to	   consider	   the	  
historical	   underpinnings	   of	   design	   as	   discipline,	   leading	   to	   the	   social	   and	   political	  
drivers	   and	   contexts	   within	   which	   it	   operates	   today.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   these	  
questions	   have	   to	   consider	   the	   grounded	   and	   heuristic	   nature	   of	   design;	   a	  
fundamentally	  situated	  practice	  whose	  artifacts	  still	  remain	  under-­‐researched	  across	  
the	  discipline.	  In	  general	  terms,	  a	  design	  epistemology	  as	  a	  truly	  distinct	  and	  rigorous	  
knowledge	  praxis	  has	  yet	  to	  emerge.	  At	  this	  50th	  Design	  Research	  Society	  conference,	  
the	   Design	   Epistemology	   Theme	   seeks	   to	   encourage	   new	   discussions	   across	   the	  
community	  to	  rigorously	  consider	  the	  scope,	  methods	  and	  veracity	  of	  design	  practice,	  
education	  and	  research.	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“But	  the	  world	  of	  design	  has	  been	  badly	  served	  by	  its	  intellectual	  leaders,	  who	  have	  
failed	  to	  develop	  their	  subject	  in	  its	  own	  terms.”	  (Cross,	  1982)	  
This	  quote	  from	  Nigel	  Cross	  is	  an	  important	  starting	  point	  for	  this	  theme:	  great	  progress	  has	  
been	  made	  since	  Archer’s	  call	  to	  provide	  an	  intellectual	  foundation	  for	  design	  as	  a	  discipline	  
in	  itself	  (Archer,	  1979),	  but	  there	  are	  fundamental	  theoretical	  and	  epistemic	  issues	  that	  have	  
remained	  largely	  unchallenged	  since	  they	  were	  first	  proposed	  (Cross,	  1999,	  2007).	  Many	  of	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these	  issues	  surround	  consideration	  of	  knowledge	  and	  its	  application	  in	  design	  processes,	  
but	  are	  also	  confounded	  by	  cultural	  trends	  that	  orientate	  views	  towards	  that	  knowledge.	  
Almost	  20	  years	  after	  the	  call	  for	  a	  foundation	  of	  design	  knowledge,	  Cross	  repeated	  one	  of	  
the	  original	  aims,	  thus	  highlighting	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  certain	  key	  areas:	  	  	  
“We	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  standards	  of	  rigour	  in	  our	  intellectual	  culture	  
at	  least	  match	  those	  of	  the	  others.”	  (Cross,	  2001)	  
Today,	  15	  years	  on	  from	  this	  quote,	  there	  remains	  no	  independent,	  epistemic	  basis	  to	  
establish	  design	  as	  a	  recognisably	  independent	  discipline,	  or	  even	  identification	  of	  
epistemological	  tendencies	  that	  have	  stronger	  relevancies	  to	  design	  processes	  than	  others.	  
First	  and	  second	  generation	  design	  studies,	  as	  well	  as	  studies	  of	  creativity	  in	  other	  
disciplines,	  clearly	  identified	  the	  types	  of	  thinking	  applied	  in	  design	  as	  divergent	  or	  
convergent	  (Jones,	  1973;	  Rowe	  1987).	  The	  same	  thinking	  structure	  has	  been	  called	  ideate	  
and	  evaluate	  (Basadur	  &	  Head	  2001),	  imaginative	  and	  logical	  (Lawson	  2006),	  generation	  and	  
exploration	  (Finke	  et	  al	  1992)	  and	  the	  generation	  of	  variety	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  variety	  
(Rittel	  1984).	  While	  these	  are	  associated	  with	  methods,	  they	  do	  not	  address	  a	  position	  or	  
attitude	  towards	  knowledge.	  This	  is	  an	  epistemology	  position;	  a	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  
includes	  how	  it	  is	  used	  in	  design	  through	  its	  scope,	  its	  particular	  methods	  and	  its	  validation.	  
Each	  of	  these	  three	  areas	  –	  scope,	  method	  and	  validation	  –	  are	  associated	  but	  can	  also	  be	  
considered	  separately.	  There	  are	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  that	  arise	  in	  doing	  so	  such	  as:	  What	  
happens	  when	  we	  start	  to	  consider	  design	  knowledge	  as	  layered,	  operational,	  effective	  or	  
framed?	  Are	  design	  epistemological	  tendencies	  necessarily	  rational	  and	  how	  might	  they	  
relate	  to	  issues	  of	  fiction	  or	  other	  human	  constructions	  of	  meaning?	  How	  does	  the	  source	  of	  
knowledge	  (episteme)	  relate	  to	  validity	  of	  knowledge	  (relevance)	  and	  the	  application	  of	  
knowledge	  (method)?	  What	  does	  repeatability	  of	  knowledge	  mean	  and	  what	  is	  an	  
acceptable	  threshold	  of	  acceptance	  to	  make	  that	  knowledge	  justifiable?	  
These	  questions	  relate	  to	  a	  ‘state	  of	  the	  art’	  which	  is	  a	  major	  motivation	  for	  this	  DRS	  special	  
theme.	  
A	  ‘constructed’	  epistemology	  
In	  the	  quotation	  above,	  Cross	  (1982)	  was	  lamenting	  that	  many	  designers	  were	  being	  
seduced	  by	  scientific	  methods	  and	  approaches	  –	  that	  the	  reductionist	  program	  in	  design,	  
developed	  in	  the	  preceding	  decades,	  was	  having	  such	  an	  influence	  35	  years	  later.	  The	  
reductionist	  program	  in	  design	  and	  design	  science	  advocated	  by	  Simon	  (1996)	  is	  still	  
apparent,	  albeit	  slightly	  changed	  (e.g.	  Papalambros,	  2015)	  but	  the	  underlying	  schisms	  
originally	  constructed	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  fully	  and	  constructively.	  	  
The	  seemingly	  endless	  debate	  on	  whether	  science	  is	  design	  or	  design	  can	  be	  science	  is	  
perhaps	  a	  symptom	  of	  this	  continuing	  lack	  of	  foundation	  (For	  an	  example,	  see	  Farrell	  &	  
Hooker,	  2012;	  Galle	  &	  Kroes,	  2014;	  Farrell	  &	  Hooker,	  2015).	  But	  such	  debates	  have	  
significantly	  influenced	  the	  conceptual	  structures	  of	  design	  knowledge.	  For	  example,	  early	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formulations	  of	  design	  as	  a	  form	  of	  knowledge	  relied	  on	  contrasts	  and	  comparisons	  of	  
design	  with	  the	  arts	  and	  science	  (see	  Cross	  (1982)	  for	  the	  clearest	  articulation	  of	  this).	  A	  
duality	  such	  as	  this	  is	  powerful	  rhetoric	  and	  easily	  understood	  in	  theory	  and	  practice	  –	  but	  
the	  justifiable	  basis	  for	  it	  has	  not	  really	  progressed	  since	  its	  original	  stating.	  It	  raises	  the	  
question	  of	  whether	  art	  and	  science	  are	  useful	  organizational	  ideas	  with	  respect	  to	  design	  
and,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  that	  the	  wider	  debate	  around	  them	  as	  knowledge	  categories	  must	  be	  
engaged.	  
There	  have	  been	  attempts	  to	  move	  away	  from	  such	  dualities,	  for	  example	  ‘intuition’	  versus	  
‘rationality’	  (Coyne	  &	  Snodgrass,	  1996;	  Poldma,	  2015),	  but	  the	  structural	  legacy	  of	  design	  
knowledge	  constructed	  ‘in	  contrast	  to…’	  remains	  and	  is	  perhaps	  now	  a	  barrier	  to	  framing	  
any	  other	  paradigm	  of	  design	  epistemology.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  motivations	  for	  this	  theme	  is	  in	  response	  to	  such	  debates	  and	  structures	  –	  that	  
their	  continuation	  might	  be	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  of	  a	  foundation	  to	  design	  as	  a	  
discipline	  with	  known	  relationships	  to	  epistemological	  tendencies.	  Perhaps,	  just	  as	  argued	  by	  
Glynn	  (1985),	  it	  is	  time	  to	  consider	  whether	  design	  can	  genuinely	  stand	  on	  its	  own	  
epistemologically.	  If	  not	  this,	  then	  at	  least	  to	  communicate	  clearly	  its	  own	  structure(s)	  to	  
those	  pursuing	  its	  resolutions.	  Certainly,	  design	  cannot	  continue	  to	  simply	  rely	  on	  
comparison	  and	  contrast	  to	  other	  subjects.	  
‘Good	  enough’	  knowledge	  
Besides	  the	  foundational	  or	  theoretical	  issues,	  there	  are	  practical	  matters	  that	  are	  affected	  
by	  such	  dualities	  and	  schisms.	  Returning	  to	  the	  Cross	  quote	  (1982),	  those	  “badly	  served”	  
include	  students,	  practitioners,	  researchers,	  teachers,	  as	  well	  as	  clients,	  users,	  the	  general	  
public	  etc.	  –	  i.e.	  pretty	  much	  everyone	  involved	  in	  design.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  who	  
benefits	  from	  keeping	  design	  processes	  and	  esoteric	  knowledge,	  which	  tends	  to	  enforce	  the	  
science	  versus	  art	  duality,	  which	  has	  become	  a	  staple	  of	  claiming	  ideological	  territories	  
within	  design	  cliques.	  The	  former	  stance	  reinforces	  a	  normative,	  logical	  or	  scientific	  
approach	  but	  has	  produced	  reductive	  models	  that	  are	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  design,	  leading	  
to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  adopted	  but	  unsuccessful	  examples	  of	  design	  processes.	  
Conversely,	  a	  relativist,	  idiosyncratic	  and	  subjective	  approach	  is	  also	  insufficient	  as	  it	  has	  led	  
to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  obfuscate	  theories	  and	  ideas	  in	  design	  –	  many	  of	  which	  are	  personal	  
expressions	  and	  non-­‐transferable	  in	  that	  state.	  Considering	  these	  poles	  as	  the	  only	  
possibilities	  also	  opens	  up	  a	  larger	  question	  –	  how	  is	  it	  that	  we	  have	  come	  to	  consider	  art	  
and	  science	  to	  represent	  all	  knowledge	  in	  all	  applications	  across	  Western	  culture?	  	  
In	  between	  such	  dualities	  are	  most	  design	  practitioners,	  teachers	  and	  researchers;	  in	  that	  
“messy	  space	  between	  people	  and	  things’	  (Koskinen	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  And	  in	  that	  space,	  design	  
is	  hard	  enough	  without	  making	  it	  harder	  by	  applying	  esoteric	  theories	  inappropriately	  or	  by	  
simplifying	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  functional	  or	  recognisable	  as	  design.	  Those	  
practising	  in	  this	  messy	  space	  are	  (currently)	  without	  a	  sound,	  simply	  articulated	  epistemic	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basis	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  articulate	  such	  a	  pragmatic	  position	  –	  this	  is	  arguably	  the	  epistemic	  
space	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  by	  design	  research.	  	  
To	  clarify,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  call	  for	  some	  theoretical	  or	  practice	  position	  on	  design,	  but	  for	  a	  clear	  
basis	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  such	  knowledge.	  It’s	  not	  acceptable	  to	  simply	  say	  things	  without	  
some	  basis	  and	  it’s	  certainly	  not	  acceptable	  to	  then	  pass	  such	  opinion	  off	  as	  knowledge.	  
Instead,	  could	  we	  not	  ask	  when	  certain	  types	  of	  knowledge	  are	  used	  in	  design	  and	  in	  what	  
capacity	  is	  it	  useful,	  relevant	  and	  operational?	  When	  is	  hard,	  quantitative	  data	  used	  and	  
what	  are	  its	  limits?	  When	  does	  narrative	  or	  fiction	  become	  relevant	  (Coulton	  et	  al,	  this	  
session),	  how	  does	  it	  intersect	  with	  other	  types	  of	  knowledge	  and	  how	  are	  these	  translated	  
into	  particular	  design	  disciplinary	  outcomes?	  When	  are	  human	  ergonomics	  or	  human	  
mythology	  considered?	  What	  modality	  of	  communication	  operates	  within	  design	  and	  how	  is	  
this	  manifested	  (Godin,	  this	  session)?	  How	  does	  social	  meaning	  or	  cultural	  expression	  
become	  clearly	  identified	  and	  how	  does	  it	  create	  defensible	  positions	  for	  a	  designer?	  How	  
does	  visual-­‐based	  content	  structure	  knowledge,	  allowing	  decisions	  and	  judgements	  to	  
operate	  and	  be	  made	  (Harland	  &	  Craib,	  this	  session)?	  	  
If	  we	  look	  at	  tendencies	  within	  epistemology,	  we	  find	  that	  each	  of	  these	  questions	  introduce	  
an	  attitude	  about	  how	  knowledge	  is	  constructed	  as	  relevant,	  what	  filters	  to	  apply	  and	  how	  it	  
becomes	  structured	  for	  use	  by	  methods	  (Plowright,	  2014).	  	  
The	  subject(s)	  of	  design	  	  
As	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  science	  versus	  art,	  a	  particular	  paradigm	  has	  emerged	  to	  frame	  
thinking	  over	  the	  past	  decades.	  One	  of	  the	  central	  claims	  made	  by	  Cross	  in	  support	  of	  a	  
separate	  and	  distinct	  design	  epistemology	  was	  this:	  
“What	  designers	  know	  about	  especially	  is	  the	  ‘artificial	  world’	  -­‐	  the	  human-­‐made	  world	  
of	  artefacts.	  What	  they	  know	  how	  to	  do	  especially	  is	  the	  proposing	  of	  additions	  to	  and	  
changes	  to	  the	  artificial	  world.”	  (Cross,	  2001)	  
This	  specific	  area	  of	  design	  research	  remains	  under-­‐represented,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  paper	  
Mapping	  design	  knowledge:	  36	  years	  of	  Design	  Studies	  in	  this	  theme.	  Ironically,	  then,	  the	  
theoretical	  and	  academic	  are	  over-­‐represented	  but	  have	  yet	  to	  establish	  any	  specific	  claim	  
whilst	  practice	  and	  material	  research	  are	  under-­‐represented	  but	  may	  remain	  the	  hope	  of	  
many	  original	  design	  researchers	  	  
We	  have,	  quite	  naturally	  as	  academics,	  taken	  an	  academic	  and	  logocentric	  approach	  to	  
knowledge	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  rigour	  in	  design	  practice	  knowledge	  itself.	  For	  
example,	  Parsons	  (2016)	  argues,	  after	  Galle,	  that	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  design	  there	  lies	  an	  inherent	  
epistemological	  contradiction:	  the	  process	  of	  designing	  is	  inherently	  uncertain	  and	  
unpredictable.	  But	  this	  argument	  relies	  entirely	  on	  a	  tradition	  of	  logical	  (almost	  positivist)	  
philosophy	  that	  is	  not	  necessarily	  relevant	  to	  a	  design	  epistemology.	  Our	  dominant	  logical	  
tendencies	  were	  acquired	  through	  Enlightenment	  philosophy	  and	  at	  a	  time	  when	  truth	  was	  
considered	  to	  be	  an	  absolute	  and	  achievable	  conclusion,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  bound	  to	  a	  
determinist	  version	  of	  progress	  bound	  to	  technical	  development	  rather	  than	  social	  justice.	  
DRS	  Theme	  7:	  	  Design	  Epistemology	  
	  
However,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  that	  rationalism	  is	  often	  misapplied	  or	  misconstrued	  in	  design	  or	  
that	  design	  methods	  look	  only	  to	  a	  clear	  line	  of	  causation	  rather	  than	  absolute	  repeatability	  
and	  factual	  defensiveness.	  Design	  knowledge	  is	  not	  necessarily	  about	  knowing	  what	  only	  the	  
final	  outcome	  is	  but	  (importantly)	  about	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  
outcome	  should	  be	  judged.	  Such	  judgement	  relies	  on	  factors	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  the	  
dynamic	  between	  people	  and	  the	  practices	  that	  generate	  these	  outcomes	  (Poldma,	  2013;	  
Poldma	  2015).	  
But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  previous	  traditions	  can	  be	  ignored	  or	  that	  no	  rigour	  is	  required	  
as	  this	  falls	  into	  common	  errors	  of	  interpretation	  as	  those	  found	  in	  siding	  only	  on	  the	  side	  of	  
extreme	  logic	  or	  only	  on	  the	  side	  of	  romantic	  imagination.	  As	  with	  the	  contra-­‐reaction	  to	  the	  
science	  of	  design,	  the	  rejection	  of	  formal	  logics	  or	  philosophy	  should	  not	  be	  a	  rejection	  of	  
any	  rationality	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  not	  acceptable	  to	  simply	  say	  that	  design	  is	  difficult	  and	  then	  
generate	  philosophies	  that	  rely	  on	  belief	  and	  rhetoric.	  Similarly,	  it’s	  not	  acceptable	  to	  invoke	  
metaphysics,	  epiphenomena	  or	  ‘wonder	  tissue’	  (Dennett,	  2013)	  and	  treat	  them	  as	  if	  they	  
were	  some	  rational	  application	  of	  knowledge	  applicable	  only	  to	  design.	  It	  might	  be	  a	  
question	  of	  enquiry	  into	  definitions	  and	  the	  specific	  adaptation	  rather	  than	  the	  formulation	  
of	  manifestos	  that	  attempts	  a	  reductive,	  unified	  theory.	  
As	  with	  the	  messy	  space	  of	  practice,	  some	  middle	  ground	  needs	  to	  be	  reached.	  Design	  
research,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  exist	  independently	  of	  other	  research	  domains,	  has	  to	  be	  rigorous	  and	  
consistent	  -­‐	  but	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  such	  rigour	  is	  constructed	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  
as	  other	  disciplines.	  The	  issue	  of	  ‘where’	  design	  knowledge	  might	  reside,	  raised	  by	  Cross	  30	  
years	  ago,	  must	  be	  tackled.	  
Internal	  conversations	  
As	  has	  been	  seen	  with	  the	  science	  versus	  art	  debate,	  there	  tend	  to	  be	  repeated	  and	  
recurrent	  themes	  in	  design	  research.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  has	  already	  been	  presented	  but	  
another	  more	  prosaic	  possibility	  exists	  –	  we	  are	  perhaps	  have	  less	  of	  a	  tradition	  and	  body	  of	  
knowledge	  as	  other	  subjects	  or	  have	  yet	  to	  ‘mature’	  in	  terms	  of	  establishing	  this	  knowledge.	  
For	  example,	  Beck	  &	  Chiapello	  (this	  conference)	  identify	  the	  lack	  of	  critical	  engagement	  with	  
Schön’s	  work	  and	  this	  may	  reflect	  the	  vacuum	  of	  work	  prior	  to	  this	  period	  –	  perhaps	  a	  relief	  
that	  there	  were	  emerging	  ideas	  and	  evidence	  that	  supported	  the	  views	  held	  by	  many	  
practitioners	  and	  design	  researchers.	  	  
Part	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  criticality	  perhaps	  comes	  from	  design	  practice	  itself	  –	  the	  purpose	  of	  
design	  is	  a	  particular	  outcome	  and	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  that	  outcome	  does	  not	  rely	  solely	  on	  
extrinsic	  or	  objective	  criteria	  –	  it	  also	  has	  typological,	  historical,	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  situational	  
content	  to	  address.	  Design	  has	  a	  tradition	  of	  using	  whatever	  knowledge	  is	  useful	  to	  the	  
purpose	  in	  hand	  which	  raises	  the	  issue	  of	  relevance	  over	  absolute	  truth	  as	  a	  criteria	  of	  
judgement	  (Plowright,	  2014).	  Such	  knowledge	  is	  often	  assessed	  and	  applied	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
its	  utility,	  not	  veracity	  but	  traditional	  academic	  practice	  requires	  the	  latter	  more	  than	  the	  
former.	  It	  is	  only	  relatively	  recently	  that	  research	  practices	  and	  outputs	  could	  be	  thought	  of	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in	  a	  similar	  way	  –	  that	  the	  non-­‐objective	  could	  be	  treated	  as	  seriously	  as	  the	  purely	  
objective.	  This	  does,	  of	  course,	  lead	  to	  problems	  and	  discussions	  of	  what	  is	  valid	  or	  
acceptable	  knowledge	  as	  other	  disciplines,	  such	  as	  social	  sciences	  and	  human	  geography,	  
have	  struggled	  with	  for	  decades.	  Many	  of	  the	  same	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  these	  domains	  are	  
relevant	  to	  design	  (e.g.	  representation;	  the	  role	  of	  the	  observer;	  interrelations	  between	  
people	  and	  technology;	  etc.)	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  deeper	  interaction	  between	  these	  domains	  is	  
noteworthy.	  As	  before,	  this	  is	  perhaps	  a	  test	  for	  any	  independent	  design	  epistemology	  –	  that	  
it	  not	  only	  maintains	  its	  own	  rigour	  and	  validity,	  but	  that	  it	  may	  also	  contribute	  to	  other	  
domains	  as	  a	  knowledge	  form	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  
What	  this	  means,	  and	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  discussion	  for	  this	  session,	  is	  that	  while	  we	  can	  ask	  
complex	  questions	  and	  maintain	  an	  attitude	  that	  design	  is	  too	  complex	  and	  too	  human	  to	  
understand,	  no	  development	  will	  likely	  occur	  until	  there	  is	  clarity	  to	  examining	  three	  aspects	  
of	  epistemology:	  namely	  1)	  the	  scope	  of	  knowledge	  (i.e.	  sources)	  found	  in	  design	  disciplines	  
and	  if	  these	  are	  shared	  or	  divergent,	  2)	  methods	  as	  representations	  of	  larger	  and	  persistent	  
underlying	  thinking	  structures	  along	  with	  either	  alignment	  to	  types	  of	  approaches	  and	  
knowledge	  (i.e.	  fiction,	  memory,	  sensory,	  visual,	  etc)	  and	  3)	  clarity	  of	  validation	  criteria,	  
understanding	  its	  relationship	  to	  other	  types	  of	  knowledge.	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